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ABSTRACT
Image Robust Hashing for Malware Detection
by Wei-Chung Huang
This research is focused on a novel approach to detect malware based on static
analysis of executable files. Specifically, we treat each executable file as a two-
dimensional image and use robust hashing techniques to identify whether a given
executable belongs to a particular family or not. The hashing stage comprises two
steps, namely, feature extraction, and compression. We compare our robust hashing
approach to other machine learning-based techniques.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Malware is software that is intentionally designed to cause harm to computer
systems [1]. Due to our heavy reliance on computers in general, and software in
particular, malware detection is a vitally important topic in information security.
Signature scanning (i.e., pattern matching) is the most common form of malware
detection, and hence malware writers have developed many concealment strategies
aimed at defeating standard signature scanning techniques [1]. These concealment
strategies result in malware families consisting of large numbers of related malware
variants. In such cases, malware detectors must focus on strategies aimed at entire
families, rather than individual malware samples.
Malware detection can be based on static analysis or dynamic analysis, or a
combination of the two. As the names suggest, static malware detection is based on
features that can be extracted without executing (or emulating) the code. For exam-
ple, mnemonic opcodes are an example of a static feature [2, 3]. On the other hand,
dynamic malware detection inspects the behavior of software, that is, the software is
executed (or emulated) and features are extracted. In any case, the resulting features
are then used to classify samples as malware or benign. In this research, we rely on
static features and we apply techniques from image robust hashing [4] and machine
learning to analyze these features
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we discuss
relevant background topics, including the malware data format in Section 2.2, the
introduction of robust hashing in Section 2.3 and Section 2.4, the features and machine
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learning techniques that we use will be discussed in Section 2.5 and Section 2.6. In
Chapter 3 we discuss our dataset in Section 3.1 and show the experiment result in
Section 3.2 and Section 3.3. Then Section 3.4 gives the comparison of the result from
using robust hashing approach to other machine learning-based techniques. In the
end, we give the conclusion and discuss the future work in Chapter 4.
2
CHAPTER 2
Background
2.1 Previous Work
In [5] they visualized raw binary data in executable files such as data files and
process memory as image, in [6] they proposed a method to visualize and classify
malware using image processing techniques where they are mainly used to extract
features to be classified. In [6] they concluded that the variation caused by conceal-
ment strategies would be ignored if we view them as an image. In [7], Tian et al
suggest that the function length plays a significant role in classifying Trojans and
they achieved 88% average accuracy over 7 different types of Trojans and 721 mal-
ware samples. In contrast to [7], [6] uses GIST [8] feature and the classifier, k-nearest
neighbors, to obtain average classification accuracy of 98% on 9,458 samples with 25
malware families.
In [4] they proposed a robust image hashing to handle the proliferation of digital
images where it can be used in many applications such as managing huge image
databases, image indexing, or image authentication [9, 10, 11]. Especially for the
hashing method of [11], it uses both global and local features where global features
are based on luminance and chrominance, and local features are based on the image
textures whereas in [12] they discussed the mathematical framework for the studies
of texture perception.
The scheme of feature extraction in the robust image hashing was proposed
by [13] where the research partitioned the process of retrieving an image hash into
two steps, feature vector extraction and compression. The extracted feature in [13]
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was also proposed by the same author of earlier research in [14]. And [15] showed an
evidence of distinguishing malicious manipulations from JPEG compression which is
based on the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) coefficient. The methods of [4] include
an image feature extraction by using a wavelet decomposition, a quantization, an
error-correcting, and a hash value measurement which is called equality percentage
(EP), the percentage of equal vector components. [4] also achieved close to 100%
EP for resistance to attacks in 100 images and achieved 45% to 65% for the test of
collision with unrelated images.
Another novel robust image hashing was found in [16], which proposed a dither-
based secure image hashing using distributed coding. The research had adopted the
idea of distributed source coding with Wyner-Ziv encoder [17] and a dithering process
which can be viewed as a side information in the distributed coding scheme and as
a way to amortize a quantization error for the similar input. Based on Wyner-Ziv
encoder, [16] proposed to treat the syndrome as the final hash value. In the experiment
result, [16] tested for 3 images in 12 variation attacks and got 16% difference in
Hamming distance manner. Moreover, the research tested 15 pairs of distinct images
on a collision experiment then achieved about 40% difference in hamming distance
manner.
2.2 Malware Images
As [6] proposed, Nataraj et al transformed a malware executable file into a two-
dimensional image. Basically, the transformation process takes the raw byte data
in an executable file as a pixel value, and then concatenate every byte (gray-level
pixel) to form a two-dimensional image. Figure 1 shows the process how it works. It
is worth to note that when generating a two-dimensional image it takes width and
4
height as a factor but here it only has the overall image length, which is the size of
width plus the size of height.
Figure 1: Visualizing malware as an image.
The malware obfuscation might be mitigated when viewing it as an image. Some
malware pictures that are shown in Figure 2 indicate the similarity between different
variations of the same family. Figure 3 includes more examples for different families.
If we look closely at the transformed executable files in Figure 4, it is clear to tell that
there are some fragments showing the structure of the executable file. For example,
.rdata section represents read-only data such as literal strings and debug directory
information, and black padding sections show the zero padding. More detail about
the binary fragment can be found in [18].
Figure 2: These three malware images are type of Trojan Downloader which is be-
longing to the same family named Swizzor.gen!E.
5
Figure 3: More example of malware images. The left three images are family
Agent.FYI. The right top three images are C2LOP.P, and the right bottom three
images are Alueron.gen!J
Figure 4: Various sections of an malware image sample.
2.3 Hashing Function
In some sense, hashing means a mapping from something to something. From
the perspective of computer science, a hash function is any function that maps the
6
data to a specific data of fixed size. On the one hand it provides an efficient way to
retrieve the data from a given hash value. On the other hand, different data could
be mapped to the same hash value, that is, collision. Here we skip normal hash
functions, instead, we look into two specific types of hashing, cryptographic hashing,
and robust hashing.
2.3.1 Cryptographic Hashing
A cryptographic hash function generally is used in cryptographic applications,
such as signature identification [19], and some hashing functions such as MD5 and
SHA-1 or even the improved version [20] are pretty popular nowadays. The reason
why it is suitable for cryptographic uses due to the following properties have to be
satisfied [21].
∙ Deterministic: No matter what size of input, it will output the small fixed
number of bits.
∙ Efficiency: It has to be efficient to compute any give data.
∙ One-way: It is infeasible to construct a message from its hash value except for
doing an exhaustive search.
∙ Collision-resistance: It is infeasible to find a collision.
∙ Sensitivity: A small change of the input message causes the hash value exten-
sively.
2.3.2 Robust Hashing
The significant difference from cryptographic hashing is that robust hashing tends
to preserve the change of the message, that is, sensitivity property is traded off
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such that it creates more collision. Although it sounds a little counter-intuitive,
it can be used to identify similar messages or data object. Clearly, it is a good
technology for authentication problems. For example, Biometric Authentication [22],
Image Watermark authentication [9], or Image Indexing [4].
As mentioned before, many applications of robust hashing are surrounded by
the field of image applications. Usually, images are subject to many modifications
such as JPEG compression, image adjustment, or malicious modification. Even those
modifications are applied, the modified images still look the same or similar. Ob-
viously, that adjudgment is based on the decision from human, not computer. So
robust hashing comes into the picture. Its goal is to identify similar visual look of
images by hashing them to the same hash value. And basically, the process of image
robust hashing can be seen at Figure 5 proposed by [13]. In Figure 5, the feature
extraction step is about to retrieve useful information in the image, and the goal of
compression step is, explicitly, to compress the intermediate hash value, or implicitly,
to reduce minor difference or noise such that similar hash values can be clustered to
the same group.
There are two main approaches proposed in the step of compression, [4] proposed
using an error-correction decoding to cancel small perturbations, and [16] proposed
using distributed source coding schema comprising a dithering process and a Wyner-
Ziv Encoder [17].
Figure 5: Process of robust hashing.
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2.4 Compression
Data compression has been widely used in many fields, for example, audio pro-
cessing, video processing, or data transmission, cryptographic, etc. Simply speaking,
it is about to compress the data by eliminating the less informative portion of data.
In terms of digital signal, it reduces bits from the original data bit-stream. Data com-
pression can be categorized into lossless and lossy compression. As the name suggests,
lossless compression reduces the size of data by eliminating statistical redundancy,
whereas lossy compression aggressively removes “unnecessary” bits. In this research,
we are more interested in lossy compression since the difference introduced in the
intermediate hash value are expected to be compressed or removed. Furthermore,
we choose to use the well-known compression technique based on an image, that is,
JPEG compression, since the data format in our research is a two-dimensional image.
2.4.1 JPEG Compression (Encoding)
JPEG stands for Join Photographic Experts Group, is a very common lossy
compression method used in 2D digital images. It is a lossy compression based on
the frequency domain, that is, the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) comes into the
picture. Rather than introducing its tedious history, we briefly explain the major
steps that are used in the compression.
1. Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT)
DCT is generally compared with the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT), where
they both aim to decompose a discrete-time vector from the spatial domain
to frequency domain with using different basis functions. DFT uses a set of
complex exponential functions while DCT uses cosine functions. Despite several
variants of the DCT, we choose the most common form, the DCT, or called
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DCT-II. We compute a 1D DCT-II as
𝑋𝑘 =
𝑁−1∑︁
𝑛=0
𝑥𝑛 cos
[︂
𝜋
𝑁
(︂
𝑛+
1
2
)︂
𝑘
]︂
𝑘 = 0, ..., 𝑁 − 1
where the 𝑁 real numbers 𝑥𝑖 are transformed into the 𝑁 real numbers 𝑋𝑖.
Hence, a 2D DCT-II is given by
𝑋𝑘1,𝑘2 =
𝑁1−1∑︁
𝑛1=0
𝑁2−1∑︁
𝑛2=0
𝑥𝑛1,𝑛2 cos
[︂
𝜋
𝑁2
(𝑛2 +
1
2
)𝑘2
]︂
cos
[︂
𝜋
𝑁1
(𝑛1 +
1
2
)𝑘1
]︂
In the normal process of JPEG compression, an 8x8 pixel-based block-wise DCT
is applied to produce DCT coefficient matrices which represent the response to
particular frequency revealing a frequency distribution. The following shows
an example of DCT transformation with the source Figure 6 and a coefficient
view applied with 8x8 blocks in Figure 7. As it shows, the overall structure
is visually recognizable due to the high frequencies along with the edges. This
observation is also proven by the fact that humans are more sensitive to the
energy of high frequency than the low frequency in an image. Hence, the next
step of the JPEG compression is to reduce the low-frequency part of the image.
2. Quantization
This quantization step takes the most critical and also the unique part of com-
pression. In general, quantization is a process of constraining the data from a
large set to a small set. For instance, converting a real number to an integer
number is always a good example. However, the metric that is used in quan-
tization really depends on the application. A good metric would result in a
good compression (low distortion rate) while a bad metric might just reduce
the set size abruptly. Recall that for the JPEG compression, we want to keep
informative data (high frequency) and reduce the low-frequency part where hu-
mans can rarely distinguish the difference. Since we have a DCT coefficient
10
Figure 6: Source image of JPEG compression.
map, it is common to quantize by dividing it with an 8x8 matrix, or so-called
Quantization Matrix where having larger matrix values in low frequencies and
smaller values in high frequencies. Figure 8 shows an example of quantization
by reducing low frequent bits from the DCT coefficient map in Figure 7.
3. Zig-Zag Scan
Since the low frequent bits are reduced, the DCT coefficient map may contain
continuous zero values. As Figure 9 denotes, this step introduces a way to
generate a coefficient vector by starting from the high frequency to the low
frequency in a zig-zag order. On one hand, a general JPEG compression can
use Huffman coding on what is left to reduce the data size. On the other hand,
the vector can be served as a frequency distribution of the given image.
11
Figure 7: 8x8 DCT coefficients
2.4.2 Channel Coding
Channel coding is a term for the error control which is used in a communication
system. In the telecommunication theory, messages are sent as a bit-stream and are
subject to channel noise. Thus, some error could be introduced from the sender to
the receiver. Error control and then comes into the picture to either detect or correct
the error, that is, ensuring the message received at the receiver is likely the same as
the original as possible. For the error correction, there are two main ways to deal
with by sending extra bits along with the message as a header or “solution”. The first
one is Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ), where the receiver will request a resend if
an error is detected. The second one is Forward Error Correction (FEC), where no
resend request is made but the message would be encoded in some way to be able to
12
Figure 8: Quantized 8x8 DCT coefficients
Figure 9: An example of zig-zag scan of the DCT coefficient map.
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be recover. In our research, we are more interested in viewing the difference from each
image with the same family as the channel noise, and then we adopt a well-known
error-correcting method, Hamming codes [23], to eliminate the noise (differences).
2.4.2.1 Hamming Encoding
Hamming codes is a family of linear error-correcting codes. It has the ability
to correct the message given to the following conditions. Given an integer 𝑟 ≥ 2,
there is a codeword with length 𝑛 = 2𝑟 − 1, and message length 𝑘 = 2𝑟 − 𝑟 − 1. For
instance, Hamming(7, 4), which is a popular configuration in the Hamming codes,
can correct 1 bit error by carrying 4 bits data with 3 extra parity bits. Figure 10
shows the concept of how it works. Within the 7 bits transmitted message, 𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3
are the parity bits and 𝑑1, 𝑑2, 𝑑3, 𝑑4 are data bits. As the figure shows, 𝑝1 determines
𝑑1, 𝑑2, 𝑑4 so on and so forth. In other words, 𝑑1 only contributes 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, 𝑑2 only
contributes 𝑝1 and 𝑝3. This implies that if 𝑑1 is flipped, then only 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 will be
affected. However, the problem would become how to associate each parity bit with
data bit such that we can validate 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 with 𝑑1 accordingly. Fortunately, 𝑝1 can
also be validated by 𝑑2 and 𝑝3.
Figure 10: Hamming(7,4) example.
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The idea behind is using an even parity check. Given the coverage of the diagram
in Figure 10, each parity bit will be determined by satisfying an even count of bits
with the followed data bits. For example, Table 1 shows an example of how to produce
𝑝1 by its coverage. If 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 is 0 and 𝑑4 is 1, and then 𝑝1 will be set to 1. These
parity bits are also called the syndrome vector, which will be transmitted along with
the message.
Table 1: Example of generating parity bit in Hamming(7, 4)
𝑝1 𝑑1 𝑑2 𝑑4
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 1 1
2.4.2.2 Hamming Decoding
In the decoding stage, we briefly introduce how to use the syndrome to recon-
struct the original message. Follow the discussion above, once the syndrome is pro-
duced, we can simply validate or locate the error bit by utilizing its even-count prop-
erty. Strictly speaking, the received syndrome will be used to check if the even-count
property is still held. If not, then we claim that there is an error in the specific
coverage. Table 2 shows the un-satisfied condition for each possible transmitted bit
is flipped. For example, assume 𝑑1 is flipped, after checking the even-count property,
the coverage will give a unique combination to indicate 𝑑1 is flipped. That is, we
know 𝑑1 is altered because 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 are not satisfied as expected. As Table 2 sug-
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gests, each flipped bit will cause a unique 3-bit combination. Therefore, by using this
mechanism, some channel noise can be corrected.
Table 2: A view of error-correcting in Hamming(7,4)
coverage 𝑑1 𝑑2 𝑑3 𝑑4 𝑝1 𝑝2 𝑝3
𝑝1 → 𝑑1 𝑑2 𝑑4 x x o x x o o
𝑝2 → 𝑑1 𝑑3 𝑑4 x o x x o x o
𝑝3 → 𝑑2 𝑑3 𝑑4 o x x x o o x
2.4.3 Distributed Source Coding
Distributed source coding (DSC) [24] is a concept of reducing the computational
burden from an encoder side. But it is subject to multiple correlated information do
not communicate with each other. How it works is by putting some information to
the decoder as a side information. Take video compression as an example. Assume
we have many embedded camera sensors deployed around Central Station to collect
pictures for an arbitrary analysis. The simple approach is letting each sensor encodes
a picture, sends it back to the server, and then the server will decode it accordingly.
However, what if there are some image noise need to be cleared, each sensor will then
have to apply a de-noise task before the compression and transmission. This certainly
reduces an overall efficiency because the noise each sensor received is similar. As a
result, DSC comes into the picture, the noise will be viewed as a side information and
acquired directly on the decoder side.
Wyner-Ziv encoder [17] is a famous example where it argues that a Wyner-Ziv
coder depends almost only on the source data, not the side information. Also, [16]
gives a conceptual view of DSC in Figure 11.
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Figure 11: Distributed source compression.
2.5 Image Features
There are many kinds of features in the field of image classification. In general,
it can be categorized to local and global features. The local feature represents the
modifications or differences in a small region of interest, such as textures. On the other
hand, global feature tends to represent the global structure of images, for example,
edges. By observing some malware images, we decide to use the following eight
features from local and global groups and two of global features are used in robust
hashing. It is also worth noting that malware images are all in gray-level view, that
is, we only consider one-channel cases.
2.5.1 Local Feature
The local feature is commonly used in texture analysis, texture synthesis. Al-
though there is no strict definition of texture, normally, people will say the repeated
patterns can be viewed as texture. Here we use two common local features attempting
to extract the repeated patterns of malware image.
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2.5.1.1 Local Binary Patterns
In the recent decade, Local Binary Patterns (LBP) is a well-known texture de-
scriptor in facial recognition [25]. The idea of LBP is extracting the local pixel
contrast while preserving the information of pixel position. Figure 12 shows the uni-
form LBP feature extraction process. Basically, the image is separated by blocks, and
each block is divided by cells, and each cell computes a histogram with respect to the
center of the cell. Finally, combine those local histograms so that we will get an LBP
descriptor of a feature vector.
Figure 12: Process of extracting LBP feature.
2.5.1.2 Histogram of Oriented Gradient
Another texture descriptor is Histogram of Oriented Gradient (HOG). Similar
to other scale-invariant feature transform descriptors, HOG has been wildly used in
object detection because of its robustness on appearance, geometric and photometric.
For example, human detection [26]. Unlike LBP using contrast, HOG uses a gradient
as its local descriptor. However, they share the process of dividing an image into
blocks and cells. Figure 13 shows how orientation histograms produce the feature
vector.
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Figure 13: Process of extracting HOG feature.
2.5.2 Global Feature
As the name suggests, the global feature is focusing on the entire image object
instead of local regions. In other words, the global feature can reflect the struct of
images. We observed that there are many commonplaces with respect to structure
such as black lines, lightness, and overall similarity.
2.5.2.1 Horizontal Edge
Edge is a very strong feature that has been widely used in many digital image
processing applications. It can also be used in combined with other techniques or
be used standalone. In our problem, we focus on those horizontal black lines with
regards to its vertical position. That is, we want to extract the distribution of all
horizontal edges in the image by projecting the magnitude on the edge map onto a
one-dimensional space. Figure 14 shows the flow of feature extraction process. Note
that we apply a low-pass filter in the middle process to enhance the edge.
To deal with the variant size of images, the pixel-based edge extraction could
be too sensitive to have a good representation. Therefore, instead of pixel-based
approach, we project it block-by-block. Figure 15 shows the distribution after the
projection. To better show the relationship between the feature and the source image,
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Figure 14: Process of obtaining the horizontal edge map (from left to right).
Figure 16 displays a side-by-side comparison in which the middle figure is the rotated
view from Figure 15.
Figure 15: Feature vector of horizontal-edge.
2.5.2.2 Pixel Intensity
The idea of this feature is to find the image-to-image similarity by measuring all
pixel intensity values. Due to the variant size of images, we compute the pixel mean
value based on grids over an entire image.
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Figure 16: Feature vector of horizontal-edge. Side-by-side comparison with the source
image.
2.5.2.3 Contrast
Contrast is one of the features that has been broadly used. Intuitively, contrast
tells us the variance for the brightness and darkness with regards to two different
image regions. However, it is not straightforward to present the difference with more
than two objects in a single value or vector. As a result, histogram comes into the
picture, and we generate a histogram for an entire image as a feature vector.
2.5.2.4 Median Filter
A median filter is one of the low-pass filters for which many de-noise techniques
are used to apply. As other low-pass and high-pass filters, the median filter does a
convolution on the image but with different window operator. Unlike average filter
and Gaussian filter, median filter tends to preserve the edge while smoothing images.
So it becomes a good candidate in our malware image analysis.
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2.5.2.5 Frequency Distribution
Based on the concept of JPEG compression, we can generate a frequency dis-
tribution for an image by taking the quantized DCT coefficient into account. Recall
that in JPEG compression, we apply the DCT to acquire a coefficient matrix for each
8x8 pixel block. Then we quantize the matrix to reduce less informative data, par-
ticularly for the low-frequency part. Finally, we re-order the matrix in a zigzag scan
manner to place each particular frequency in a descending order. Hence, if we want
to get a frequency distribution to represent the whole image, we then collapse each
distribution for each 8x8 pixel block to construct an overall distribution where the
high-frequency energy part of the image falls into the top position and low frequent
part to the end position. In sum, this frequency distribution tells the variance of
visual look in terms of frequency regardless of its position.
2.5.2.6 Statistical Features based on Wavelet Transform
Regardless of the heavy mathematical structure of the wavelet transform [27],
we are more interested in extracting some statistical features based on a frequency
domain. Very roughly speaking, the wavelet transform can be used to analyze the
signal in the frequency domain with a temporal information, unlike Fourier transform,
it more focuses on the precise frequency analysis. Furthermore, wavelet transform has
been widely accepted to use on many image processing analysis.
In our case, we decompose the image to several sub-bands as shown in Figure 17.
We then compute some statistical features from each band. For example, we compute
the mean pixel value on the coarse band and the variance on the fine band. To increase
the resolution of the feature, we tilt each sub-band image into multiple blocks and
then apply the extraction accordingly. One reason we extract different feature on the
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different band is due to the information gain by the given band. For example, the
coarse band provides fewer details but more overviews. Lastly, we concatenate each
value to form a feature vector and apply a uniform quantizer 𝑄 to produce a length-𝑙
vector 𝑥 = 𝑄(statistical features) ∈ {0, 1, ..., 127}𝑙
Figure 17: Wavelet decomposed image for each level (sub-bands).
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2.6 Support Vector Machines
Among those well-known machine learning techniques, Support Vector Machines
(SVM) [28] is a supervised learning and a powerful tool which has been widely used
in many machine learning problems due to its efficiency and simplicity. Especially
for the classification, unlike an HMM or PCA which typically generates scores, SVM
produces the direct classification result. Therefore, SVM is always a good starting
tool to address classification problems.
2.6.1 SVM Overview
From the perspective of classification, a good classifier should separate each class
clearly. In other words, there are one or more hyperplanes that can split the training
samples into the corresponding classes. And SVM comes into the picture. Figure 18
gives an overview. In general, there are four ideas behind SVM as following.
Figure 18: Separating hyperplane with maximizing margin.
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∙ Separating hyperplane
For typical SVM, we are used to indicating a binary classification. Therefore,
one of the goals of SVM is to find a hyperplane that can separate two labeled
data. The hyperplane here means a space with 1 less dimensionality than the
original space.
∙ Maximize the margin
Not only finding a separating hyperplane, SVM tends to maximize the margin
between training data and the hyperplane. One of the significant advantages
is that it can have more space to classify the data. On the other hand, a
disadvantage is the margin could be affected by an outlier, fortunately, SVM
has a mechanism to deal with this, that is, support vectors.
∙ Classify in a higher dimensional space
Sometimes the data is bare to be separated in its own space or dimension,
however, in the context of SVM, it provides a way to transform the original
space to higher space in order to get a more clear view for the data.
∙ Kernel trick
To transform the data to higher space brings a significant drawback, which is
heavy computation. However, as the name suggests, this kernel trick plays an
important role to transform the data with much less computation overhead.
Figure 19 shows data separation in different view of dimensions.
2.6.2 Training Phase
Since SVM is a supervised learning having labels with 1 and -1 as an example
of binary classification. As mentioned before, the goal of SVM is to find a separating
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Figure 19: SVM kernel trick.
hyperplane with maximizing its margin to training sample points. As a result, an
optimization problem comes into the picture. To be more specific, the problem of
SVM training becomes an optimization problem. The general training steps are given
below.
1. Given a set of labeled training samples 𝑋𝑖 where 𝑖 = 1, 2, ..., 𝑛 with the corre-
sponding class in labeled value 𝑧𝑖 ∈ {+1,−1}.
2. Choose a kernel function 𝐾 and a regularization parameter 𝐶 > 0 , where 𝐶
indicates the tolerance of the margin.
3. Obtain 𝜆𝑖 and 𝑏 by solving the optimization problem
Maximize : 𝐿(𝜆) =
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝜆𝑖 − 1
2
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑛∑︁
𝑗=1
𝜆𝑖𝜆𝑗𝑧𝑖𝑧𝑗𝐾(𝑋𝑖, 𝑋𝑗)
Subject to :
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝜆𝑖𝑧𝑖 = 0 and 𝐶 ≥ 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0 for 𝑖 = 1, 2, ..., 𝑛
2.6.3 Scoring Phase
To score the testing sample, by leveraging the hyperplane, SVM simply plug the
testing sample in the trained hyperplane and check the direction with respect to the
labeling training data.
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1. Given a testing sample 𝑦 and obtain a score.
𝑓(𝑦) =
𝑠∑︁
𝑖=1
𝜆𝑖𝑧𝑖𝐾(𝑋𝑖, 𝑦) + 𝑏
where 𝜆𝑖 and 𝑏 is computed from the training phase and s is the number of
support vectors
2. Classify the score according to
𝑐(𝑦) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 if 𝑓(𝑦) > 0,
−1 otherwise
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CHAPTER 3
Implementation and Result
3.1 Dataset
The dataset we use from [6] is called MALIMG dataset. As Table 3 shows,
this dataset consists of total 9,342 grayscale images of transformed binaries from 25
families including family type Wrom, Trojan, Backdoor, PWS, and etc. Figure 21
gives an overview of malware images belonging to various families. The detail of how
does an executable file transform from the raw binary to a two-dimensional image can
be found in Section 2.2. To construct our benign samples, we use 120 executable files
that can be downloaded for free online and passed the antivirus software we have, for
example, the 360 Total Security. The benign executable files include PHPSetup.exe,
Audio Record Wizard.exe, WindowsDeviceRecoveryToolInstaller01.exe, and etc. To
make the samples comparable, we also convert them to grayscale images. By doing
this, we obtain 120 grayscale images of benign samples. Figure 20 shows some benign
images that are transformed from various executable files.
Figure 20: Examples of benign images.
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Table 3: MALIMG Dataset.
No. Family Name Family No. of Variants
1 Allaple.L Worm 1591
2 Allaple.A Worm 2949
3 Yuner.A Worm 800
4 Lolyda.AA 1 PWS 213
5 Lolyda.AA 2 PWS 184
6 Lolyda.AA 3 PWS 123
7 C2Lop.P Trojan 146
8 C2Lop.gen!G Trojan 200
9 Instantaccess Dialer 431
10 Swizzor.gen!I Trojan Downloader 132
11 Swizzor.gen!E Trojan Downloader 128
12 VB.AT Worm 408
13 Fakerean Rogue 381
14 Alueron.gen!J Trojan 198
15 Malex.gen!J Trojan 136
16 Lolyda.AT PWS 159
17 Adialer.C Dialer 125
18 Wintrim.BX Trojan Downloader 97
19 Dialplatform.B Dialer 177
20 Dontovo.A Trojan Downloader 162
21 Obfuscator.AD Trojan Downloader 142
22 Agent.FYI Backdoor 116
23 Autorun.K Worm:AutoIT 106
24 Rbot!gen Backdoor 158
25 Skintrim.N Trojan 80
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Figure 21: Malware images belonging to different families.
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3.2 Classification
Before we dive into the detection process, it is always worth to evaluate how well
the selected features are and how good the model is. General speaking, if we can
properly classify the malware families with the selected features and classifiers, those
features and models are then played as a good representation in some sense.
3.2.1 Machine Learning-Based
From a high volume of machine learning techniques, we pick SVM as our clas-
sifier due to its robustness, simplicity, and efficiency. Therefore, in this section, the
discussion will be covered from feature selection to the classification result.
3.2.1.1 Feature Selection
In the machine learning-based approach, we use 2 global and 4 local features in
the experiment. Those are LBP, HOG, Horizontal-Edge, Pixel Intensity, Contrast,
and Median Value. Although there are many types of feature in image processing,
the reason we only pick total 6 kinds of features in our experiment is that malware
image provides limited information. All we can perceive is not really human readable,
for example, most of the images consist of noise and line segments. As a result, we
do not use a feature such as color, saturation or SIFT, which is commonly used in
object detection.
3.2.1.2 Parameter Tuning
In our parameter tuning, we classify all 25 families with smaller data set by
five-fold cross-validation for each type of features and take as much parameter sets
as possible. The goal is to find the “best” parameter set in terms of every individual
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type of features. Figure 22 shows the accuracy with respect to different settings in the
certain type of feature for the global features, and Figure 23 shows the same result
for the local features.
Figure 22: Classification accuracy using the local feature.
It is worth noting that in Figure 22, the global features do not perform well in
the case of malicious images, the highest accuracy is less than 80%. Whereas the local
features in Figure 23 outperform the global one, they nearly achieve 90% accuracy.
And this can be explained by the fact that the malware images are dominated by
noises and lead to a bad accuracy.
3.2.1.3 Feature Reduction
In the context of classification, we would like to reduce those unrelated feature
dimensions to keep a good consistency. As a result, we proceed a feature reduc-
tion process in two steps, Univariate Feature Selection (UFS) and Recursive Feature
Elimination (RFE).
1. Univariate Feature Selection (UFS)
In this step, we take each type of features to feed into our classifier then keep the
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Figure 23: Classification accuracy using the global feature.
best one in terms of accuracy, then based on the selected one, we combine with
the rest features to generate a two-types feature up to total 6. Figure 24 depicts
a bar chart for the experiment. Surprisingly, one of the features outperforms
the others, and it is the horizontal-edge feature.
2. Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE)
According to the result from UFS, we pick the feature with a highest accuracy
as an input in the RFE process. But the length of dimensionality is still too
high, for example, 256 dimensions in our case. Thus, we run a feature reduction
process. RFE is an iterative process to eliminate feature dimension. In brief, it
removes a dimension, re-trains the rest of dimensions, and removes so on and so
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Figure 24: UFS result of all 6 types of features based on malware accuracy.
forth. The result can be seen in Figure 25. The accuracy is getting lower when
we reduce the dimension to 20% of original dimensions (50 out of 256), and this
is because the horizontal-edge is designed to represent the whole structure of
an entire image. Thus, even though cutting the dimensions to 50 can reduce
more space, we pick the one with the maximum accuracy in the number of 169
dimensions.
3.2.1.4 Result
In our classification experiment, We achieved 92% overall accuracy on 25 families
with five-fold cross-validation using reduced feature in SVM classifier. Figure 26 gives
a confusion matrix view for more classification detail.
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Figure 25: RFE result on horizontal-edge feature.
Figure 26: Confusion matrix of classifying all 25 families using reduced horizontal-
edge.
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3.2.2 Robust Hashing-Based
Recall that in Figure 5, a general robust hashing has two major steps, feature
vector extraction and compression. In this project, we implemented two approaches
from [4] and [16], and then we conducted an improvement based on those two methods.
The following sections will discuss each approach in detail from the step of feature
extraction to classification.
3.2.2.1 Error-Correcting Approach
This approach is based on [4], using a wavelet feature and a error-correcting
decoder. The general idea is that extract some statistical information (features) from
different frequency bands and then put those features altogether by eliminating small
difference leveraged an error-correcting decoder.
Under this approach, with 25 families and five-fold cross-validation we achieve
79% average accuracy and 90% while taking 19 families into account. Figure 27
gives more detail. Specifically, we use a 2D Haar-wavelet transform with 5 levels
decomposition and apply an uniform tilting for each sub-band to form a feature
vector. And then we use a scalar quantization to normalize the feature vector with
128 scales. After all features are acquired, we choose Hamming(7, 4) decoder to
correct the sequence of quantized 7-bits value to generate a vector representing an
image from one family.
∙ Implementation
We compute a representative hash value for a certain family by taking the mean
hash values from the training set. And therefore, we will have multiple keys to
form a model to indicate which hash value should belong to which family. For
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Figure 27: Classification result with error-correcting approach over 25 families.
example, we classify a sample 𝐼 to 𝐼𝑖 if 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝐼, 𝐼𝑖) is the minimum Euclidean
distance for 𝑖 = 1 to 25.
Furthermore, Figure 28 gives another view while using wavelet features in our
application. For the first and the second (from left to right) bin, it shows that
the fewer wavelet level is used, the fewer information is gained, therefore the
accuracy is compromised. However, if we fix the wavelet level while increasing
the number of tilting blocks, the accuracy is increasing as shown in (5, 5)
setting to (5, 10) in the same figure. In other words, the result suggests that
the more wavelet levels and blocks not only increase the chance of acquiring the
information but also improve the accuracy.
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Figure 28: Accuracy in different wavelet transform level.
38
3.2.2.2 Distributed Coding Approach
From the idea of distributed coding [16] and its diagram Figure 29, we know
that we could put a side information (which is dither in our case) as another secret
key in a hashing and produce less side effect to the hash value. And from [29], we
implement Wyner-Ziv encoder by using a JPEG compression along with Hamming
code to produce the syndrome as the final hash value.
Figure 29: Overview of distributed coding scheme.
Overall we achieve 83.34% classification accuracy over 25 families by using five-
fold cross-validation. Compared with the error-correcting approach, it improves 4%
accuracy. However, the dithering process is not a cheap work, it dramatically reduces
the efficiency more than 10 times. And therefore, we isolate the dithering step to
keep good efficiency with less impact on the accuracy, that is, we are able to maintain
almost 83% accuracy and a consistent performance from the previous approach. As
Figure 30 shows, without dithering, the overall accuracy is 82.63%, and 90% accuracy
can be reached if we only discard 3 families over 25 families.
∙ Implementation
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Figure 30: Classification result with distributed coding approach over 25 families.
There is one adjustment we put in this approach. In feature extraction step,
not only we take each DCT block to generate a frequency distribution then
produce the feature vector, but also we separate a source image into several
horizontal segments before extracting features. The reason we do this way is
we observe that the major visual difference between each family is the position
of those horizontal lines in an image. Hence, we believe that we can extract
better information by segmenting some horizontal blocks. Figure 31 shows the
result of using a different number of segments and it also supports our horizontal
segments assumption. As it suggests, when we uniformly split the image into
8 horizontal segments, the better accuracy can be achieved. The reason is that
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more segments will consider more unrelated pixels (noise), and fewer segments
will lose the detail from the perspective of global view.
Figure 31: Accuracy with different horizontal segments in distributed coding ap-
proach.
After we acquire an extracted feature vector 𝑉𝑖 for each family sample, we then
use Hamming(7, 4) to encode and produce a syndrome by concatenating the 3
syndrome bits to form a length 𝑙 string 𝑆𝑖, where 𝑖 = 1 to the number of training
samples in a family. For all 𝑆𝑖 we then pick and append the majority symbol (0
or 1 in our case) at the aligned position within the length 𝑙 to generate our final
hash key 𝐾𝑖. Finally, we use Hamming distance function 𝑓ℎ as an evaluation
metric to determine the classification. That is, we classify a sample 𝐼 to 𝐼𝑖 if
𝑓ℎ(𝐼, 𝐼𝑖) < 𝑓ℎ(𝐼, 𝐼𝑗) where 𝑖 ̸= 𝑗.
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3.2.2.3 Multi-phase Approach
From the classification result of the previous approaches, we observe that some
families are classified well in one approach whereas classified bad in another, for exam-
ple, family Autorun.k is classified well in error-correcting approach but in distributed
coding approach. Given this observation, we decide to combine this two approaches
to conduct a new multi-phase approach which is shown as follows.
1. Scoring from error-correcting approach
Recall that we have a set of hash keys 𝐾𝑎 = {𝐻𝑎𝐾𝑖} which are generated from
the error-correcting approach where 𝑖 is the index of family and 𝑎 is the index of
approach, and we then compute a Euclidean distance for each incoming sample
𝐼 with 𝐾𝑎 to get a set of distance where 𝐷𝑎 = {𝐷𝑎𝑖}. Then, we get a set of
similarity scores 𝑆𝑎 = 1/(1 +𝐷𝑎). The higher score it is, the higher probability
𝐼 will be classified to.
2. Scoring from distributed coding approach
Similar to the phase1, we replace the part of classification approach with dis-
tributed coding. Clearly, we will also get a set of scores 𝑆𝑏 = 1−𝐷𝑏 where 𝐷𝑏
is a set of normalized Hamming distance for input 𝐼 to the stored hash keys 𝐾𝑏.
3. Merging
This phase will combine the score set 𝑆𝑎 and 𝑆𝑏, and then determine which
classification result should be used by taking the variance of scores in each
set into account. In other words, by selecting the ability of classification for
different approaches, multiple choice manner should perform better than just
using a single approach. Intuitively, it is easy to pick the best score of them
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then determine which approach should be used, however, those scores are not
from the same distance basis, that is, the score only correlates to itself within
the same approach. As a result, we devise a way to combine those scores by
connecting different score bases altogether. To be more specific, for 𝑆𝑎 and 𝑆𝑏,
we compute a variance which provides information of how “separate” each set
of hash keys is. For example, if top 3 score of 𝑆𝑎 is 1.0, 0.9, 0.9, and top 3 score
of 𝑆𝑏 is 1.0, 0.7, 0.4, and then 𝑆𝑏 will be chosen due to its high variance.
Figure 32 shows the result, 87.3% average accuracy is achieved over 25 families
and we are able to maintain a high accuracy 90% by just discarding one family.
Figure 32: Classification result with multi-phase approach over 25 families.
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3.2.2.4 Comparison
In the comparison section, Figure 33 shows the classification accuracy over three
different hashing approaches. Obviously, the multi-phase approach is able to select a
better approach from the error-correcting and the distributed coding, as a result, it
generates a better classification accuracy. It is also worth noting that the distributed
coding has 0% accuracy at the family Autorun.K but the error-correcting approach
can achieve 100%. After we carefully investigate that family and the scores, we find
out there is another family Yuner.A which is very close to Autorun.K. As Figure 34
shows, these two families are perceptually identical and this explains why Autorun.K
is classified to Yuner.A in the distributed coding approach.
Figure 33: Robust hashing with different approaches.
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Figure 34: Image view of family Autorun.K and Yuner.A.
We also want to examine what is the outcome if we mix up the hashing ap-
proaches and the features plus the h-edge which is well performed in our machine
learning-based approach. So far we have two channel coding types, Hamming de-
coding (error-correcting) and Hamming encoding (syndrome), and two features, fre-
quency distribution and statistic wavelet. And now we want to examine another
feature, h-edge, which is the selected feature from our machine learning based ap-
proach in Section 3.2.1, to see if it still works in a robust hashing manner. We
carefully experiment all of these three features and two channel coding types while
picking the best parameter configuration on each experiment round.
Figure 35 gives the overall comparison with regard to the average accuracy over
25 families. As a result, we have the following two conclusions. First, the h-edge does
not perform well with the use of robust hashing which is because, in the machine
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learning-based, SVM has support vectors whereas in robust hashing-based it takes
the whole feature vector into either decoder (error-correcting) or encoder (syndrome).
That is, the channel coding process considers a whole picture of view in the extracted
features. Second, the error-correcting approach is less sensitive to the features. That
could be explained by the fact that error-correcting is designed to eliminate noise
(or the difference between features) such that no matter what features are coming,
a certain among of noise will be removed. On the other hand, the syndrome does
nothing for correcting or eliminating noise, what it does is picking 3 important bits
from the original source data. That is, it is expected to reflect robustness of selected
features.
Figure 35: Comparison of different features and channel coding types.
46
3.3 Detection
In this section, we discuss how we handle the benign case with the existing models
and two major approaches from our previous classification architecture. Furthermore,
we then show the detection result by the view of ROC curve and AUC table.
3.3.1 Machine Learning-Based
This approach is based on our multi-class classification model in the previous
section. To achieve the detection we simply treat all families as one big family, called
malware. The idea behind this approach is by using a method proposed by [30] which
estimated a probability of each sub-model. That is, each testing sample will output
𝑁 probabilities where 𝑁 is the number of sub-models. Given all training samples,
we then expect to find a minimum probability which is being correctly classified for
each family and that implies the chance of given sample will be classified to which
family. For example, in the training phase, if we set those minimum probabilities as
the threshold for each sub-model, the sample will be determined as a certain malware
family if the classifying probability is larger than the minimum threshold that we
have trained. If the classifying probability is smaller than all of them, it will be
treated as benign. As a result, we will have a probability as the threshold for all
training families. Figure 36 shows the minimum and maximum correctly classifying
probabilities within each family.
Also, as Figure 36 suggests, however, some sub-models do not perform well
(C2LOP.gen!g, C2LOP.P, Swizzor.gen!E, Swizzor.gen!I). Based on the higher min-
imum probability indicates the better inner classification, we claim that those low
probability sub-models do not contribute that much. In other words, those models
could harm the overall detection rate.
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Figure 36: Minimum and maximum probability in each family.
A similar conclusion can also be made from Figure 37, which gives the number
of families of which the minimum probability is larger than a certain threshold. The
higher the threshold we set, the fewer families satisfy, the better the benign detection
accuracy rate will be. As we can see from the figure, the benign detection accuracy
rate drop to almost 0 from 0.78 when family numbers increase from 22 to 25.
To better prove our deduction, we experiment the benign accuracy in the sense
of ranked models. Similar to UFS, we select the top-k well-performed families as
our training set, and Figure 38 shows the result. As we expected, it achieves 91%
benign accuracy when 21 families are used. It is worth to note that the detection
rate is based on the minimum probability of each trained model being set to be the
threshold. The accuracy of malware sustains a very high rate by eliminating the four
sub-models that do not perform well.
From Figure 38 we are more interested in the set of 25 families, 24 families, and
to the 18 families. In the following experiment, we compare different approaches for
determinng the threshold in the detection. First, we treat all sub-models evenly and
48
Figure 37: Relationship between the threshold and the number of families.
Figure 38: Benign detection accuracy over top k performed families.
give a uniform threshold for each of them. As we concluded before, each sub-model
might contribute unevenly. Therefore, in the second approach, we use minimum
probability as the base for each family. And in the third approach, we want to
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examine the mix case on the first approach and the second approach, that is, we lower
each threshold from the second approach by two standard deviations. Figure 39 and
Figure 40 reveal the ROC curve and Table 4 shows the AUC results.
Figure 39: ROC of malware detection by using SVMs with the threshold is evenly
distributed.
Table 4: AUC results with the different threshold approaches.
Approach Number of sub-models18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Uniform value 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.998 0.998 0.995 0.987 0.988
Lower minimum probability 0.984 0.986 0.972 0.922 0.794 0.768 0.791 0.801
Minimum probability 0.986 0.989 0.984 0.975 0.904 0.830 0.793 0.756
Clearly, if we use a uniform threshold for all sub-models, the detection rate out-
performs the separated one. This can be explained that the generated probabilities of
most samples are higher the threshold in an uniform thresholding manner. Also, when
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Figure 40: ROC of malware detection by using SVMs with the threshold is using the
minimum probability.
we use the minimum probability as the threshold, for the low probability sub-models,
there are more zooms to increase the threshold and it is likely to be misclassified
as benign, hence the true positive rate drops. In other words, as we discard those
sub-models, meaning we tend to keep high probability sub-models, the range of the
threshold in each sub-model is more stable.
Given the high threshold (probability) for most of our samples, we want to see
what happen if we loosen the threshold to make it lower than the minimum proba-
bility but keep their individual impact of each sub-model by subtracting two times of
standard deviation on the training probabilities. The result can be seen at Figure 41.
As we concluded, discarding some low probability sub-models can improve the ac-
curacy, but the AUC does not change that much in that the samples of mid-high
probability sub-models have higher variance such that the AUC is compromised.
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Figure 41: AUC view of different threshold approaches.
Although the approach of using individual weight is worse than using the uniform
weight, it is still worth to construct these two models to generate a two-pass detection
process. In the first pass, we can use the model with the uniform weight to easily
separate benign and malware. If the sample is detected as malware, it will be fed into
the second pass, which uses the weighted models. The benefit of using the two-pass
model is we can classify the malware more precisely. For example, we can give a strict
and loosen threshold for high risk and low-risk family respectively.
3.3.2 Robust Hashing-Based
In this section, we discuss how we use robust hashing to detect malware. Since
we already have a hash secret key for each malware family, we can treat all secret
keys in all families as a one malware family. If there is a new sample whose hash
value is close enough to any family, then say it is malware, otherwise benign.
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Instead of comparing the hash value and the secret key directly, we use the score
that comes from our error-correcting and distributed coding approach to determine if
it is malware or benign. Recall that this score indicates how close to a certain family
the sample is. It is worth to note that the reason we do not use the score from the
multi-phase approach is that the basis of the score could be vary such that there is
no single threshold can determine.
In our experiment, we detect malware based on three robust hashing approaches
that we have discussed previously. In order to visualize the detection result, we use a
ROC curve and an AUC to represent the robustness of robust hashing on the malware
detection. Furthermore, we are also interested in what is the impact of just using
top-k well-classified families, such that it can be carefully compared with the result in
the Section 3.3.1. Figure 42 shows the best detection rate while using error-correcting
approach in terms of ROC curve and AUC. Figure 43 and Figure 44 show the ROC
curve of using distributed coding and multi-phase approach respectively, and Table 5
gives more AUC result from three different hashing approaches.
As we concluded in the classification section, multi-phase should have the ability
to select the best approach to detect or classify, and our result shows it performs better
than the other two approaches. However, there is only one difference in the detection,
that is, we use two thresholds for determining which score should be considered.
The reason why error-correcting approach outperforms to distributed coding
is that the error-correcting has more abilities to handle unknown samples, and its
wavelet decomposition serves as a better feature due to its variety and statistical
property in different image sub-bands. In contrast, the distributed coding approach
relies more on its extracted features due to the lack of correcting step, even though
its classification result is slightly better than the other.
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Table 5: AUC results with the different hashing approaches.
Approach Number of sub-models18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Error-correcting 0.814 0.782 0.764 0.754 0.744 0.734 0.731 0.720
Distributed coding 0.732 0.711 0.681 0.677 0.677 0.663 0.649 0.649
Multi-phase 0.810 0.779 0.763 0.745 0.734 0.726 0.722 0.720
Figure 42: ROC of malware detection by using error-correcting approach of robust
hashing.
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Figure 43: ROC of malware detection by using distributed coding approach of robust
hashing.
Figure 44: ROC of malware detection by using multi-phase approach of robust hash-
ing.
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3.4 Discussion
3.4.1 Machine Learning-Based
The first approach we implement is by using a supervised learning classifier which
we pick SVMs, with extracting some image features based on the observation of input
images. This also includes feature selection and feature reduction. In our experiment,
we carefully select features from the perspective of global and local, and we find out
global feature performs better than the local. Furthermore, there is only one feature,
h-edge, stands out of total 6 features by running a univariate feature selection, and
achieve 92% classification accuracy over 25 different families. We then move on to
the detection phase based on our SVM model.
In the detection step, we need to consider another sample set, the benign set.
But there are not many similarities in between, for example, the original malware
family has many similarities in its line structure. As a result, instead of training the
benign set into our malware model, we leverage a generic multi-class SVM scheme to
generate a probability for each family of being correctly classified. From this manner,
we are able to determine a sample should be classified to a specific family, or classified
to benign if none of the probability or threshold is held.
At the first stage, unfortunately, we test all 25 families and the benign set, the
detection accuracy for the benign is almost 0%. Meanwhile, we find that there are
some families or sub-models do not contribute that much because of low probability
they have. So we do another experiment to see the accuracy by discarding the family
or sub-model that theoretically contributes less in the whole picture. Finally, we get
an AUC 0.756 over 25 families and AUC 0.986 over 18 families. And we relax the
assumption that each sub-model has its own contribution in the overall detection
scheme, as a result, we get AUC 0.988 over 25 families.
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3.4.2 Robust Hashing-Based
Using a robust hashing on malware detection is a novel idea. Through our
implementation and experiment, we are able to hash each malware sample into a hash
value, or even to generate a secret hash key to represent the family. By comparing with
the hash value and the secret hash key, we then can do classification problems under
the definition of robust hashing. In our work, we implement three robust hashing
methods, error-correcting, distributed coding, and multi-phase. The first two are
partially from the previous work. We also use the feature from the previous work
as a comparison. Those features are wavelet-decomposition and DCT coefficients.
However, due to the application and the specific type of input images that we use,
it is not trivial to compare our result with the previous work. Instead, we take
the previous work in our experiment as the base to be compared with our machine
learning-based approach and multi-phase approach.
In the classification, we get 79% accuracy in error-correcting approach and 83%
accuracy in distributed-coding approach over 25 different families. We also carefully
analyze different configurations of the features in terms of the average accuracy. Fi-
nally, we propose a new method, multi-phase, which is generally based on previous
two approaches. It has the ability to pick which approach should be used and as
expected, it gets improved and achieves 87% accuracy overall. By showing our ex-
periment result, we also delicately analyze the difference between the previous work
and our work.
Based on three robust hashing methods that we have implemented, we take the
benign set into consideration and deem every malware family as one giant malware
family. That is, we hash a benign sample into a hash value and then compare it with
25 pre-hashed secret keys. If it is close enough to one of malware family, we then
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label it to malware, otherwise to benign. Under this manner, we get the AUC 0.72
over 25 families and AUC 0.81 over 18 families by using the proposed multi-phase
approach.
3.4.3 Comparison
Overall, regarding classification, machine learning-based approach achieves bet-
ter classification accuracy, 92% over 87% in robust hashing-based. This is not really
surprising because, from the perspective of SVMs, its goal is to maximize the margin
for different classes of samples. Moreover, in the step of feature reduction, SVMs is
able to have a clear view of the features to train a model. In other words, it can
inherently eliminate noise or outliers before going through the training process. If
the feature is well selected and representative, then the classification result should be
really sweet.
However, for the robust-hashing, even though the feature we have extracted is
also representative, unlike SVMs, robust hashing does not have optimization step to
find the best separation. Instead, it only takes one class at a time into consideration
and trying to eliminate the difference between the samples. Another evidence to prove
our conclusion is that SVMs has a kernel trick, which lets the classifier to process in
higher dimensions in which the separation might be better.
When considering the detection problem, generally it is more difficult than clas-
sification problem. Theoretically, we could say the more malware families we have,
the harder we can recognize benign sample. Based on this assumption, we gradually
discard one family at a time, and the detection accuracy does improve. Again, ma-
chine learning-based approach outperforms than robust hashing-base, however, if we
carefully check on the ROC curve of the case of minimum probability in SVM ap-
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proach and the cases in robust hashing approach, the latter is relatively stable when
we discard certain families. This can be explained that when training the SVMs,
some well-defined sub-models might dominate the less-representative sub-models. Or
it can say those “good” sub-models are compromised by a small portion of the “bad”
sub-models. In that case, when we gradually discard families, the detection accuracy
dramatically gets improved. On the other hand, the training process in robust hash-
ing is independent of other families. So even when we reduce the number of families,
the detection accuracy does not improve real quick.
In sum, those two ways of malware classification and detection are performing
not much significant different in terms of the accuracy. But they could be distinct
from practical applications. For example, if there are more families come into the
picture, in SVMs, it must re-train the model which is not very efficient, and the
most important is that the new model could be significantly different from the old
model, therefore, the overall model could be unstable. However, robust hashing can
simply train a new family for generating its secret key without introducing significant
compromise in the previous keys, hence the burden is much less than using SVMs.
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CHAPTER 4
Conclusion and Future Work
4.1 Conclusion
In our work, we presented a novel way for malware classification and detection
based on robust hashing and carefully compared it with using machine learning tech-
niques.
First of all, based on the malware images we were able to build a classification
model by using SVMs. By observing the given malware images, we concluded that the
global features outperform the local features and one of the global features, namely,
horizontal-edge feature, plays a critical role in our machine learning-based approach,
although there were other 5 features that might be good to represent a malware image.
We also carefully examined the configurations of each type of features and leveraged
UFS and RFE to select the final feature in our classification model.
Followed by the classification model, we conducted a detection method utilized
the probability of each malware family that is being correctly classified. Given the
probability of each family, we concluded that some malware families are not well-
contributed in the detection process, thus, we trained two models with different prob-
ability thresholding metrics. The result showed these two models can be used as a
two-pass detection process, that is, the first pass will use an uniform thresholding to
determine if it is malware, then in the second pass, the model will be used to do a
precise classification.
Secondly, we developed a robust image hashing on the malware images with
two different kinds of approaches. These approaches also involved other researching
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areas such as communication system, information theory, and data compression. We
delved into each categories extracting some concept that can help with the robust
hashing and finally completed implementing the classification and detection process.
We also improved the classification in terms of the average accuracy by devising a
new approach in which we consider a score from the two approaches. At the end, we
concluded that while the robust hashing-based approach does not exceed the machine
learning-based in terms of the accuracy, it is still worth to use the robust hashing-
based approach given that a large number of malware families could be a practical
situation.
4.2 Future Work
We presented two ways of addressing malware detection, machine learning-based,
and robust hashing-based, where those are based on image processing techniques. But
there are some elements might improve our detection.
The first one is the features. Given our observation of malware images, global
features play an important role in our case, however, there are few families that
do not reflect this property. For example, images in family Swizzor.gen!I are not
visually identical in terms of the structure. One way to improve this is obviously by
combing other local features such as Gabor filter, etc. But the most important thing
is if we can determine whether the compared family is well presented with local or
global features. Maybe we can devise a scoring mechanism in a two-phase detection
manner, if the sample gets a bad score from the first pass, then the second pass
will take place by involving local features. Another experiment we can try is to use
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on the combined features instead of throwing
the feature away under the case of UFS or RFE.
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Another interesting work we can do is to analyze the malware image, specifically,
the executable files. As we discussed in Section 2.2, there are various sections such as
.text and .rdata section, etc. In our work we treated those sections evenly, however, we
can try to focus more on each section to give them different weights. Furthermore, it
would be interesting if we can find out where the most of variations would be spotted,
we might be able to target those area(s) for further precise detection process.
Second, in terms of the classification, we can also use a hybrid classifier which
might include Naive Bayes, Random Forest, AdaBoost, etc. In that sense, we will be
able to get a series of classification results or scores and then we make the final classi-
fication decision. For instance, by picking the major vote on the result or classifying
with the scores.
Third, from the robust hashing-based perspective, we can try different cluster-
ing techniques such as K-means, K-nearest-neighbor, Gaussian Mixture Model, etc.
where those techniques are closely related to the concept of robust hashing. From
the perspective of the generated secret key, it would be interesting if we view the key
as a plain text and the incoming hashed value as a cipher text, then the simple sub-
stitution attack might help with solving the clustering problem. And of course, from
the side of the compression, it could be replaced by other channel coding algorithms
such as Reed-Muller coding or Trellis-Coded Modulation (TCM).
Lastly, we can separate our detection process into several sub-processes. As we
suggested before, for SVMs, it performed really good for a small number of families.
So we could separate our malware SVM model into different models where each model
is customized for different families. The reason is trying to make the SVM training
more precise on some specific types of family. Also, different features could be made
if there is not only one big malware model is presented.
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